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Abstract—ZigBee Light Link (ZLL) is the low-power mesh
network standard used by connected lighting systems, such
as Philips Hue, Osram Lightify, and GE Link. These lighting
systems are intended for residential use but also deployed in
hotels, restaurants, and industrial buildings. In this paper, we
investigate the current state of security in ZLL-based connected
lighting systems. We extend the scope of known attacks by
describing novel attack procedures to show that the ZLL
standard is insecure by design. Using our penetration testing
framework, we are able to take full control over all three
systems mentioned above. Besides novel attack procedures, we
also extend the intended wireless range of max. 2 meters for
configuring a ZLL device to over 30 meters, thus making ZLL-
based systems susceptible to war driving. We conclude with
a discussion about the security needs of connected lighting
systems and derive several lessons for Internet of Things
security that can be learned from the insecure design of ZLL-
based connected lighting systems.
1. Introduction
The interest of consumers in connected lighting for
residential environments increased rapidly since 2012. The
major reason is the introduction of new product lines of
connected lighting systems that can be controlled via remote
control, smartphone or tablet.
In September 2012, the LIFX bulb was presented on
Kickstarter [1], an online crowdfunding platform, and raised
1.3 million dollar within two months. LIFX light bulbs
connect to the home WiFi network, can be controlled via
a mobile device and and require no additional hardware. A
few weeks later, Philips introduced Hue, which is considered
the most popular connected lighting system for homes today
[2]. The Philips Hue system comprises white-color as well
as RGB-color LED light bulbs, LED strips, wall and ceiling
lights, as well as portable lights. Philips Hue has an open
API for developers to build third-party applications. We
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found1 123 Android apps in the Play Store and 96 iOS
apps in the AppStore that relate to Philips Hue. Philips’
consumer luminaries, the sector of which Philips Hue is the
main product line, had a worldwide revenue of more than
500 million Euros in 20152.
In 2014, Osram and GE Lighting entered the market
with their connected lighting systems called Lightify [4]
and Link [5], respectively. During the Eurovision Song
Contest of 2015, an Osram Lightify system combined with a
smartphone voting app reflected the atmosphere in the public
viewing area to “give the major event a further emotional
touch” [6]. Osram Lightify offers white-color and RGB-
color LED light bulbs, LED stripes, ceiling and wall lights,
as well as garden spotlights, while GE Link supplies only
white-color LED light bulbs focusing on the US market. All
these lighting devices can be controlled via wall switches,
smartphones or tablets. Philips Hue, Osram Lightify, and GE
Link are based on ZigBee Light Link (ZLL) standard, while
the LIFX lighting system is based on the 6LoWPAN mesh
network standard that is not subject of our investigation in
this paper.
The ZLL standard provides two procedures for setting up
a new network for ZLL devices, or to bootstrap a new ZLL
device to an existing ZLL network: classical commissioning
and touchlink commissioning. Although classical commis-
sion is usually applied, each ZLL-certified device must
implement both commissioning procedures. The security
features of the ZLL touchlink commissioning procedure rely
on a global ZLL master key that is used to encrypt the current
network key before this key is transmitted to the joining
device. This ZLL master key is distributed to manufacturers
of ZLL-certified devices under a non-disclosure agreement
(NDA). However, in March 2015, the ZLL master key was
leaked on Twitter3 as shown in Figure 1. Ever since the
leakage of the ZLL master key, the touchlink commissioning
procedure is considered to be insecure.
Goals. In this paper, we investigate the state of security
in ZLL-based connected lighting systems. To this end, we
systematize the known attacks that have been previously
1. As of August 2, 2016
2. Consumer luminaries take 7% of the overall sales of Philips lighting
division according to Philips Annual Report 2015 [3].
3. https://twitter.com/mayazigbee
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Figure 1: The ZLL master key was leaked via Twitter in
March 2015.
presented, mainly in a non-academic context. Furthermore,
we provide a security analysis of the ZLL touchlink com-
missioning procedure which has not been part of a compre-
hensive security analysis before, to the best of our knowl-
edge. We provide full technical details and a comprehensive
evaluation of the three most popular connected lighting
systems that facilitate the ZLL standard: Philips Hue, Osram
Lightify, and GE Link. We further discuss which level of
security is appropriate for connected lighting systems and
which lessons can be learned for Internet of Things (IoT)
security from the insecurity of ZLL.
Results. Our evaluation shows that the classical commis-
sioning procedure is deployed per default by the manufactur-
ers. Attacks against the classical commissioning procedure
are known and successfully tested with the connected light-
ing systems Philips Hue and Osram Lightify [7], [8], [9]. We
focus on the touchlink commissioning procedure, which also
provides an attractive target since it must be implemented in
each ZLL-certified device, and describe novel attacks that
exploit design flaws in the touchlink specification of the
ZLL standard. We implement a penetration testing frame-
work, evaluate these attacks, and describe difficulties we
encountered during our investigations. We are able to force
bulbs to accept a new network key, which allows us to send
commands to the bulbs, e.g., to turn them on or off, or
to change the color. In this analysis, we discovered further
attacks that can be performed even without the knowledge of
the ZLL master key indicating that these systems have been
insecure even before the leakage of the ZLL master key. For
example, we are able to remove arbitrary light bulbs from
the legitimate networks. We can also cause bulbs to blink
for several hours, while the legitimate user has no chance to
shut the bulbs down except through physical disconnection.
We prove that the three popular connected lighting sys-
tems Philips Hue, Osram Lightify, and GE Link are vulner-
able to these attacks. Besides novel attack procedures, we
also increase the attack range significantly. In fact, touchlink
commissioning is intended to work in close proximity (max.
2 meters) only. In our evaluation, we are able to control
ZLL-certified devices using touchlink commands from a
distance of 15 to 36 meters, depending on the manufacturer.
Finally, we derive four critical points of failure in IoT
security that can be learned from the insecure design of
the ZLL standard.
Implications. The security mechanisms of ZLL-based con-
nected lighting systems contain fallback solutions and flaws
that allow an attacker to remotely control the lights from
a certain distance. We show that these security weaknesses
have a real-world impact on three popular ZLL-based con-
nected lighting systems. Since ZLL devices can be remotely
controlled from a distance of more than 30 meters, these
devices are vulnerable to war driving and targeted attacks.
As connected lighting systems gain an increasing popularity
since 2012, we hope that our findings can raise the attention
of the security community to improve security measures
in connected lighting systems and other residential IoT
networks.
Outline. The paper is structured as follows. We introduce
the system architecture of ZLL-based connected lighting
systems from the consumer perspective in Section 2. In
Section 3, we describe relevant technical details of the ZLL
standard, and outline the ZLL security features in Section 4.
We systematize previous attacks in Section 5. The threat
model that we assume for the remaining part of this paper
is presented in Section 6. We perform the security analysis
of touchlink commissioning, which contains the description
of novel attacks as well as their evaluation, in Section 7.
The implications of our findings are discussed in Section 8.
This paper concludes in Section 9.
2. ZLL-based Connected Lighting Systems
We investigate the security of the three popular con-
nected lighting systems by Philips, Osram and GE that use
the ZigBee Light Link standard as of May 2016. We intro-
duce the consumer view on these systems in this section,
and then present technical details of the ZLL standard in
Section 3.
2.1. System Architecture
Figure 2: System architecture of a ZLL-based connected
lighting system with two bulbs.
The general system architecture is presented in Figure 2.
Each connected lighting system consists of at least one smart
light bulb and a bridge (also referred to as gateway or hub)
(a) Philips Hue (b) Osram Lightify (c) GE Link
Figure 3: Product pictures of the three evaluated connected lighting systems.
that is used as a ZigBee transceiver to communicate with the
bulbs. The bridge connects to the home router via Ethernet
(Philips) or WiFi (GE, Osram).
Connected bulbs can be physically turned on and off
using regular light switches, but this is usually not desired
since off-state bulbs cannot be controlled by mobile devices
anymore. To turn on or off as well as to change color and
brightness of the light, a manufacturer- or third-party app on
a mobile device (or a computer) is required. The user uses
the app to send commands via the Internet and/or home
router to the bridge, which translates the commands into
ZigBee command frames and transmits them to the light
bulbs. There also exist remote controls (Philips) and ZigBee
dimmer switches (Philips, Osram) that can directly send
ZigBee commands to the bulbs without connecting to the
home router.
2.2. System Setup
We analyzed a Philips Hue starter set including one
bridge and three white and color ambiance LED bulbs,
which is exemplary shown in Figure 3a. Furthermore, we
deployed an Osram Lightify gateway with a classic A60
tunable white LED bulb as second evaluated lighting system
as shown in Figure 3b. Our third connected lighting system
is the GE Link starter pack containing a Link hub and two
Link A19 soft white LED light bulbs, similar to Figure 3c.
For the initial setup of each system, the user installs the
manufacturer-specific app on a mobile device. In addition,
it is mandatory to register a user account for the Osram
Lightify or GE Link system. For Philips Hue, the registration
of an online account is only mandatory if the user wants
to remotely control the lights, e.g., from the work place.
In the deployment of the Osram Lightify and GE Link
systems, the user connects his or her mobile device to a
WiFi-network that is provided by the bridge using the WiFi
credentials printed at the back of the bridge. Then, the user
is asked to enter the WiFi credentials of the home router
into the app and as a result, the bridge connects to the
home router. To deploy the Philips Hue system, the users
connects the bridge with the home router using an included
Ethernet cable. Finally, the user commissions the bridge and
the bulbs that belong to a single connected lighting system
to a new ZLL network by following the instructions of the
manufacturer-specific app.
3. ZigBee Light Link
ZigBee is a wireless low-power standard that connects
embedded technologies in personal area networks (PANs).
PANs are networks that allow the communication among
personal devices such as computers, mobile phones, sensors,
or household devices. Compared to WiFi, ZigBee-certified
devices send smaller packets and consume far less energy,
while ZigBee has a larger wireless range than the regular
Bluetooth.
3.1. ZigBee Overview
The ZigBee specifications are maintained by the ZigBee
Alliance, a global non-profit organization that comprises
over 250 members. The ZigBee Alliance defines the net-
work, security, and application layers and supervises the
conformance and interoperability of ZigBee-certified prod-
ucts. The ZigBee specifications include different application
profiles comprising customized sets of features and proto-
cols for specific application areas, such as ZigBee Home
Automation (ZHA) [10], ZigBee Smart Energy (SE) [11],
or ZigBee Light Link (ZLL) [12]. Application profiles differ
in functionality as well as in security levels.
In this paper, we focus on the ZLL application profile,
which was developed with the contribution of Philips, Os-
ram, GE, STMicroelectronics, Greenwave, Ember (acquired
by Silicon Labs in 2012), Texas Instruments, Atmel, and
NXP [13].
A new revision of the ZigBee specification, ZigBee 3.0,
was released in December 2015 [14] to ZigBee Alliance
members but has not been disclosed to the public yet.
ZigBee 3.0 is announced to replace a subset of the existing
application profiles (including ZLL) but also to provide
backwards compatibility. As of the beginning of August
2016, there are no products available that are certified for
ZigBee 3.0.
3.2. Stack Architecture
The ZLL stack consists of four layers: physical (PHY),
medium access control (MAC), network (NWK), and ap-
plication (APL). The two lower layers, PHY and MAC,
are defined in the IEEE 802.15.4-2003 specification [15].
This specification is also incorporated into other WPAN
standards, most prominently Thread Group [16] and Wire-
lessHART [17]. The PHY layer is the lowest layer and
defines the physical interface. ZigBee uses radio-frequency
communication in the 2.4 GHz ISM band, which is divided
into 16 channels of each utilizing 2 MHz bandwidth. The
MAC layer provides functionalities to transmit data frames
in a reliable manner by managing access to the radio chan-
nel via CSMA/CA mechanisms, sending beacon frames,
acknowledgement frames, and performing synchronization
techniques.
The NWK layer is specified in the 2012-ratified ZigBee
Pro [18] standard, and manages network topology, routing,
security services, and acts as a message broker. The APL
layer implements the application profiles, which is, in the
case of connected lighting systems, the ZLL profile.
4. ZLL Security
4.1. Security Goals
While ZLL standard does not define security goals [19],
the ZigBee Pro specification describes security assumptions
[18, p. 426] but no security goals either. For this reason, we
define following security goal that applies to ZLL networks:
Only the legitimate user should be able to add, control, or
remove devices in a ZLL network, i.e., the legitimate user
always keeps control over all devices in a ZLL network.
4.2. Security Mechanisms
Security measures in ZLL are only applied to the NWK
layer. The MAC layer, as defined in the IEEE 802.15.4
standard, supports different encryption and authentication
mechanisms. However, these security mechanisms are not
implemented in ZLL-certified devices. Also, the ZLL profile
does not support security at APL layer.
ZLL-certified devices facilitate the AES-CCM* authen-
ticated encryption scheme4 using a 128-bit network key,
which is shared between all devices of a network to secure
the communication. During the initial setup, a ZLL device
performs a commissioning procedure to obtain the network
key.
4.3. Commissioning
Commissioning is the process in which a new ZLL
network is set up or a new ZLL device is added to an
existing network. The ZLL standard specifies two commis-
sioning procedures: classical commissioning and touchlink
commissioning. Each ZLL-certified device supports both
commissioning procedures, which differ in key management
schemes and key transport protocols.
4.3.1. Classical Commissioning. The classical commis-
sioning procedure is specified in the ZigBee Pro standard
and is supported by ZigBee devices of different application
4. Compared to AES-CCM (without asterisk), this specific mode allows
also encryption-only or integrity-only variants.
profiles, e.g., ZLL or ZHA. One purpose of the classical
commissioning procedure is to connect ZigBee devices of
different application profiles.
The network discovery is triggered by the device that
wants to join a network by sending beacon requests on
different channels. If a coordinator of an existing ZLL
network is open for new devices, this coordinator replies
with a beacon response containing information about the
network including a flag indicating joining permission. Then
the new ZLL device decides whether it joins the network or
not.
In contrast to the classical commissioning in regular
ZigBee networks where a trust center handles the key man-
agement, there is no trust center deployed in ZLL networks.
Therefore, the coordinator device sends the network key
directly to the joining device. This network key is encrypted
using a ZLL-specific global ZLL link key, which is dis-
tributed to the manufacturers under an NDA. The ZLL link
key has not been leaked to the best of our knowledge.
Security weaknesses in the classical commission pro-
cedure, especially a fallback mechanism to the publicly
known global default trust center link key, are described
in Section 5.
4.3.2. Touchlink Commissioning. The touchlink commis-
sioning procedure was firstly introduced in the ZLL stan-
dard, and is not supported by devices of other ZigBee
application profiles. Touchlink was especially designed to
meet the usage requirements of connected lighting systems.
Compared to classical commissioning, touchlink commis-
sioning provides an extended functionality that goes beyond
the plain joining of devices. One of the goals is to enable use
cases in which the commissioning procedure is performed
between low-function device, e.g., a remote control, and a
bulb. For such scenarios, touchlink commissioning offers
also the possibility to manage network features with the so-
called touchlink commands.
In Figure 4, we describe the commissioning protocol
for joining a new device to an existing ZLL network. The
touchlink commissioning protocol is executed between two
entities, an initiator and an end device. The initiator is
usually either a controller, such as a remote control, or a
bridge, i. e., a ZLL device characterized by a physical button
which is pushed to start the commissioning procedure. The
initiator is typically already a member of a network or is
used to establish a new network. The end device represents
the ZLL device that shall be added to the network, usually
a LED light bulb.
First, the initiator starts the device scan procedure by
sending scan requests on different channels as defined in the
ZLL specification. These scan requests include a randomly
generated transaction identifier. The end device replies with
a scan response containing the same transaction identifier, a
random response identifier, the list of all supported keys, and
further information. On receipt of a scan response from an
end device, the initiator may request more information about
the sub-devices of the target in case there exists multiple
sub-devices, e.g., if the light bulb is equipped with multiple
Figure 4: Touchlink commissioning protocol in the ZLL
profile.
lights that can be controlled separately. In this case, the
initiator sends a device information request and the targeted
end device responses with the device information response.
The device scan may yield multiple potential devices
from which the user can select one for the next steps. The
user has the option to send an identify request to a device,
upon which the target device performs a predefined identifi-
cation action, e.g., a light bulb will flash for a few seconds.
An identify request contains the corresponding transaction
identifier as well as the duration of the identification action.
To join a new end device to a network, the initiator en-
crypts the current network key using the procedure described
in Section 4.3.3, builds a network join end device request
containing the encrypted network key, transaction identifier,
the key index as well as further network information, and
then sends this command frame to the selected end device.
On receiving the message, the joining end device replies
with a network join end device response indicating success.
4.3.3. Network Key Encryption. During the touchlink
commissioning procedure, the initiator encrypts the network
key and sends this encrypted key to the joining end device.
The scan response indicates the keys available to the
end device, in our scenarios the ZLL master key. The ZLL
master key is distributed to certified manufacturers of ZLL
products and bound with an NDA.
To encrypt the randomly chosen network key, the ini-
tiator expands the transaction identifier and the response
identifier to a 128-bit number, which represents the plaintext
input of the AES-ECB encryption, while the ZLL master key
is used as encryption key. The resulting ciphertext output is
called transport key. In the next step, the actual network key
is encrypted using the AES-ECB encryption mode and the
transport key.
5. Related Work
5.1. Security in ZigBee and IEEE 802.15.4
The security of the ZigBee standard as well as the
underlying IEEE 802.15.4 standard attracted much less at-
tention in the academic research community compared to
other wireless standards, such as WiFi, Bluetooth or mobile
telephony.
Sastry and Wagner [20] analyzed the security mecha-
nisms of the IEEE 802.15.4 protocol. However, these mech-
anisms are not used in ZigBee, as we describe in Section 4.2.
Wright [21] published the penetration testing tool KillerBee,
which allows to sniff and analyze traffic of ZigBee and other
IEEE 802.15.4-based networks. Wright also exposed that the
network key of the then-current ZigBee standard was sent
in clear text over the air. He demonstrated successful replay
attacks using prior captured ZigBee traffic. The ZigBee
Pro specification, released in 2012, addressed these security
weaknesses. Goodspeed et. al. [22] developed exploration
tools to analyze the wireless attack surface of IEEE 802.15.4
networks. Armknecht et. al. [19] present a formal security
model for the ZLL touchlink commissioning. Further papers
[23], [24] cover security issues of ZigBee networks but these
papers refer to security weaknesses concerning outdated
ZigBee specifications and have not been evaluated with
ZigBee-certified products.
5.2. Attacks Against Connected Lighting Systems
Since the emergence of connected lighting systems in
2012, these systems have been subject to a number of
security investigations.
Dhanjani [25] published implementation weaknesses of
the command authentication in the Philips Hue lighting
system. He discovered that the secret whitelist token, which
is required to authenticate the commands sent via the REST
API from the app (or website) to the bridge, is an MD5 hash
of the MAC address of the controlling device. He developed
malware that computes whitelist tokens and permanently
issues ‘all lights off’ commands in an infinite loop to local
Philips Hue bridge, since the IP addresses of the bridges
are predictable. This results in local blackouts of all Philips
Hue systems that are connected to the same LAN. In addi-
tion, Dhanjani describes threats concerning remotely issued
blackouts based on password leaks.
Chapman [26] obtained the firmware of LIFX light
bulbs via a JTAG debugger and extracted cryptographic key
material through reverse engineering of the firmware. He
used the knowledge of the keys to decrypt captured IEEE
802.15.4 packets from the communication between LIFX
bulbs as well as to send arbitrary commands to the bulbs,
e.g., to turn off the lights. Note that the LIFX system is not
based on the ZLL standard.
Heiland [27] exposed vulnerabilities in the Osram Light-
ify system. Through reverse-engineering, he discovered that
WiFi credentials are stored in plaintext in the iOS Light-
ify Home app. Also, he revealed that the communication
between app and gateway is insufficiently authenticated.
Concerning the implementation of the ZLL standard, he
criticized the lack of a routinely renewal of the network
key.
Ronen and Shamir [28] used the Philips Lux lighting
system, which is the white-color variant of Hue, to build a
covert channel for the exfiltration of data from an isolated
environment. Also, Ronen et. al. [29] demonstrated an attack
in which they switch Philips Hue bulbs on and off from a
distance of over 70 meters. However, at the time of writing
no technical details were known due to the responsible
disclosure procedure the authors of the attack initiated.
Zillner et al. [8], [30] exposed security weaknesses in the
ZigBee specification regarding the classical commissioning
procedure. They showed that ZLL lighting systems use
publicly known fallback keys in the classical commissioning
procedure for the initial key exchange, which allows the
extraction of the network key assuming the key transport
frame was captured by the attacker during the commission-
ing of a device to a network. In their scenario, the user
can be tricked into recommission a device to a network via
jamming or sending a ‘reset to factory default’ command.
With the knowledge of the current network key, the attacker
can join the network and send commands to other devices
in the network. In a demonstration, they showed that they
can turn the lights of a Philips Hue bulb on and off [9].
In another attack by Zillner et al., the attacker ‘steals’ bulbs
from a legitimate network and joins them to its own network
through sending a ‘reset to factory default’ command and
waiting until the bulb searches for a new network. Since the
bulb connects automatically to the first available network,
no interaction of the user is required. The attack descriptions
do not provide technical details, e.g., how to send a ‘reset to
factory default’ command. Their attacks have been proven
to be successful from a distance of at 3 meters [7] using the
RaspBee platform as radio transceiver.
In Section 7, we present novel attacks focusing on the
touchlink commissioning procedure and give full technical
details and evaluation results.
6. Threat Model
The threat model is determined as follows: The user
of the ZLL network is trusted and honest, and installs
the ZLL network as demanded by the manufacturer. The
online account credentials for the remote access to the ZLL
network are not disclosed. The ZLL devices are certified by
the ZigBee Alliance and follow the protocols described in
the ZigBee Pro and the ZLL specifications. Therefore, the
ZLL devices are equipped with the actual ZLL master key.
The goal of the attacker is undermine the security goals
described in Section 4.1, i.e., to take complete control of
devices in the ZLL network. Therefore, either the attackers’
equipment needs to be within the wireless range of the
targeted ZLL network, or alternatively, a remotely controlled
radio transceiver is located in the range of the ZLL network.
An example for a remotely controlled radio transceiver can
be an IEEE 802.15.4 radio transceiver that has a GSM
interface with a SIM card module. In this scenario, the
attacker can trigger an attack remotely via sending an SMS
to the device. We assume that attackers are able to eavesdrop
and inject packets in the wireless communication of at least
one ZLL device of the targeted ZLL network. We further
assume that attackers have neither physical access to the
ZLL devices nor to any interface of the local area network
(LAN) or wireless LAN (WLAN) to which a ZLL gateway
might be connected.
7. Security Analysis of Touchlink Commission-
ing
We divide our attacks in two categories: In the first cat-
egory, we describe attacks that exploit security weaknesses
in the concept of so-called inter-PAN frames. These attacks
require no knowledge of any cryptographic material. In the
second category, we show attacks that need knowledge of
the ZLL master key. Using this key, we gain control over
multiple ZLL devices in a ZigBee network. In Figure 5, we
provide an overview of all attacks that are described in this
section.
Figure 5: Overview of attacks.
The attacks in this section outline the procedures to
compromise a single ZLL device, which is in our scenario
a connected light bulb. All attacks can be easily extended
to target multiple ZLL devices at the same time by running
the attack procedures parallel for different target devices.
During the evaluation, we realized that the connected
lighting systems are not performing the touchlink commis-
sioning procedure by default. Instead, the classical commis-
sioning procedure described in the ZigBee Pro specification
is deployed. Only the Hue lighting system provides an API
command to trigger the touchlink commissioning procedure.
Nevertheless, all tested devices support the ZLL touchlink
commissioning and are vulnerable to the presented attacks,
even if they do not use this commissioning procedure by
default.
7.1. Penetration Testing Framework
For our research, we developed a penetration testing
framework in Python to evaluate the security of ZLL de-
vices. This framework consists of three major components:
First, a touchlink library to build arbitrary touchlink packets
and to keep track of source addresses and sequence numbers.
Second, a crypto module that provides the functionality
to encrypt and decrypt ZigBee packets. This component
also handles key transport frames, especially decrypting the
encrypted network key, and vice versa. Third, the radio
interface module enables the communication between the
radio transceivers and the touchlink library.
We utilize two different hardware platforms to send and
receive ZigBee packets: the Moteiv Tmote Sky, a small sen-
sor node, and the software-defined radio Ettus USRP B200.
The Tmote Sky features a MSP-430 micro controller and
an IEEE 802.15.4-complaint radio. For the communication
between the Tmote Sky and the touchlink library, we use the
KillerBee framework [21]. The second radio transceiver, the
USRP B200 from Ettus, is a software-defined radio covering
the radio-frequency range between 70 MHz and 6 GHz. The
USRP features an FPGA and connects to a host computer
via USB 3.0. We use Scapy-radio [31] as interface to send
and receive ZigBee packets with the USRP. Scapy-radio
itself uses capabilities of GnuRadio and an IEEE 802.15.4
GnuRadio flow chart implementation [32].
In addition, we implemented a command line tool that
performs the attack procedures described in the following
sections, and an injection module that is able to inject
arbitrary packets.
7.2. Testbed
In the setup of our evaluation, we follow the instructions
of the corresponding manufacturers for the consumers, as
described in Section 2, to establish a realistic deployment
simulating the conditions of a regular smart home. This in-
dicates that all presented attacks apply to all ZLL networks,
even if this network was originally set up using the classical
commissioning procedure.
Before starting our evaluation, we updated the Philips
Hue firmware to the then-latest version 01031131 as well
as the API to version 1.12.0. We updated the Osram Light-
ify gateway WLAN to version 1.1.2.101 and the gateway
ZigBee to version 1.2.0.67. We found no possibility to
update the GE Link firmware by using the manufacturer-
recommended Wink app.
The attacker equipment comprises a laptop on which our
penetration testing framework, described in Section 7.1, is
installed. A radio transceiver, which is either the Tmote Sky
or the Ettus USRP, is connected to the laptop. We started the
evaluation of each attack with this default deployment, in
which the lighting system works as intended and the system
is not compromised.
7.3. Exploitation of Inter-PAN Frames
Inter-PAN frames are a special type of ZigBee frames
that allow the communication between different personal
area networks (PANs). In the touchlink commissioning pro-
cedure, inter-PAN frames are used to transmit touchlink
commands and their responses between initiator and end
device.
Since there exists no shared key material between dif-
ferent PANs, inter-PAN frames are neither secured nor au-
thenticated. Therefore, all attacks presented in the section
are performed assuming no knowledge of the ZLL master
key nor of any other cryptographic material relating to this
devices.
7.3.1. Active Device Scan. The active device scan searches
for ZLL devices in wireless range of the attackers equip-
ment. The active device scan is a prior step that is mandatory
in preparation of any further attack.
Procedure. The attacker builds a scan request, then sends
this inter-PAN command frame on all ZigBee channels
consecutively and listens a few milliseconds on each channel
for scan responses. The scan response of each responding
ZLL device contains the 32-bit response identifier, a list of
all supported keys, and information about sub-devices as
well as other network-related information and parameters.
Through the reception of scan responses, the attacker learns
about all ZLL devices that are also listening on this channel.
ZigBee uses 16 channels in the 2.4GHz ISM band:
channel 11 to 26, while channel 1 to 10 are located in
other ISM bands. The ZLL profile specifications define four
primary channels on which ZLL devices are listening for
radio-frequency signals: 11, 15, 20, and 25. These channels
are used for commissioning and normal operations, while
all remaining channels can be used as backup.
Evaluation. The active network scan works with all three
lighting systems. In general, all light bulbs responded to
the scan request, while also the Lightify gateway answers
each time. The Link hub does not respond to scan requests,
and the Hue bridge only replies if the button on the hub was
pushed within the last 30 seconds. The state and color of the
light bulbs is not changed, and also the connection between
the legitimate controller and the bulbs is still working.
ACK Spoofing.
Figure 6: Acknowledgment spoofing.
All following attacks start with an active network scan
and then send further inter-PAN command frames. The
reason for spoofing is that the Lightify bulb as well as the
Link bulb demand a MAC-layer acknowledgment about the
successful reception of the scan response at the destination
device. Otherwise, no further inter-PAN command frames
would be accepted. Because our implementation failed to
send the acknowledgment within the demanded time frame
of 864 microseconds, we spoof another ZigBee device in
the network that acknowledges the reception of the scan
response, even if this device did not send the scan request,
as shown in Figure 6. With this trick, we are able to perform
further attacks procedures (e.g., blink attack, reset attack,
etc.) against Lightify and Link bulbs. The spoofed device
can belong to any arbitrary ZigBee network but has to listen
on the same channel as the targeted device, and needs to be
located in the wireless range of the target. To spoof a device,
we set the extended source address of the scan request to
the extended address of the spoofed device.
In contrast, the Hue bulb responses to any arbitrary
originator because apparently no acknowledgment on MAC-
layer is required.
7.3.2. Blink Attack. The touchlink commissioning proce-
dure provides the possibility to request a ZLL device to
identify itself. Originally, the identify procedure is intended
to give the resident a possibility to select and identify a
certain bulb, which shall be added to the network. From a
technical perspective, the initiator sends an identify request
inter-PAN command frame to a selected end device, which
starts flashing for a specified period of time. This command
can be abused by the attackers to annoy or frighten residents.
Procedure. After an active network scan and the reception
the scan responses, the attacker can send an identify request
to the targeted ZLL device. The identify request contains
the fields transaction identifier and identify duration. The
transaction identifier needs to be set to the same value as in
the scan request. The identify duration can be at maximum
0xFFFE, which converts to a time duration of 18 hours 12
minutes 14 seconds. If the identify duration is set to 0, a
previously started identify procedure is aborted before the
specified duration elapsed. Setting the identify duration to
0xFFFF requests the bulb to perform the identify procedure
for a default period of time, usually a few seconds.
At the reception of the identify request, the targeted ZLL
device starts blinking for the defined period of time.
Evaluation. Each of the three presented lighting systems
is vulnerable to the blink attack. During the blinking of the
lights, the users can neither turn off nor control the light bulb
using apps provided by the manufacturer. The only way to
shut down the lights is to physically disconnect the bulb
from the power supply. The attacker can abort the attack
anytime by sending another identify request with the field
duration set to zero. The maximum duration of blinking
that can be triggered with a single identify request is shown
in Table 1. We assume that the duration depends on the
manufacturers implementation of the ZLL standard.
After performing the blink attack, the Hue bulb returns
to the pre-attack state and color, while the Lightify bulb
and the Link bulb change to the default state and color.
This attack also works if the bulb is originally turned off
but supplied with power.
System Attack runtime
Philips Hue 18:12:14h
Osram Lightify 9:12:53h
GE Link 9:06:31h
TABLE 1: The maximum duration of the blink attack.
7.3.3. Reset Attack. In this attack, the attacker resets all
settings of a ZLL device to the factory-new state.
Procedure. The attack is performed by sending a reset to
factory new request inter-PAN command frame after a prior
active network scan. The payload of the reset to factory
new request only contains the transaction identifier. On
the reception of a valid reset to factory new request, the
light bulb discards the current configuration. The color and
brightness of the light bulb changes to the default states.
The user needs to recommission this device into the home
network.
Evaluation. Our evaluation showed that all three lighting
systems are vulnerable to the reset attack. The color of the
lights changes to the default color, which is in the most
cases warm white. Internally, all configuration parameter of
the bulb are set to factory-new.
Because the bulb is factory-new, a legitimate user can
easily reintegrate the bulb in the home network by searching
for new devices in the app. This operation has to be initiated
manually by the user. In the mean time, i.e., before the user
initiates a recommissioning, an attacker has the chance to
hijack the resetted device using classical commissioning in
combination with the publicly known fallback trust center
link key as already demonstrated [8].
Interestingly, we are also able to reset the Lightify
gateway (at any time) as well as the Hue bridge (if the
button of the bridge was pushed within the last 30 seconds)
to a factory-new state.
7.3.4. Denial-of-Service Attacks. We present two ap-
proaches to perform a denial-of-service attack: In the first
approach, we force a targeted ZLL device to change the cur-
rent channel to another channel determined by the attacker.
In the second approach, we join the targeted device to a
non-existent network. In both cases, the user loses control
over this device. In our evaluation, denial-of-service attacks
differ from the reset attack in the process of recovery: after a
reset attack, the user can simply recommission the attacked
bulb to the network again. In the aftermath of a denial-of-
service attack, the user needs to reset the bulb first before a
recommissioning process to the network is possible.
Procedure. A change of the wireless channel can be en-
forced by sending a network update request inter-PAN com-
mand frame. The command must include a network update
identifier that is higher than the current update identifier of
the targeted network, which is a counter that is incremented
every time when network settings are changed. The current
network update identifier can be retrieved from the scan
response of the target device, besides other network infor-
mation. After receiving the network update request, which
includes the new channel, the target device switches to this
channel. The legitimate network does not recognize the shift.
As a consequence, the targeted device is not receiving user
commands anymore.
Using a network join end device request inter-PAN
command frame (instead of the network update request),
an attacker can manipulate additional network settings like
the PAN ID and the current network key. The attacker sets
the encrypted network key to a random 128-bit value. The
attacker sends the network join end device request to the
targeted ZLL device on the channel on which the device
is currently listening. On the reception of a valid network
join end device request, the ZLL device leaves its current
network and sets the internal parameters according to the
new configuration. The transaction is confirmed by sending
a network join end device response. The targeted ZLL device
is not commissioned to the legitimate network anymore.
Evaluation. In the evaluation, all three presented lighting
systems are vulnerable to both denial-of-service attacks. The
attack does neither change the color nor the state of the bulb
but after performing the attack procedure, the targeted bulbs
cannot be controlled by the user anymore.
Since the ZLL master key has been leaked, we can
enhance the denial-of-service attack to the so-called hijack
attack described in Section 7.4.1.
Recovery. All lighting systems integrated functions to regain
control over attacked devices. However, these procedures are
not obvious at first sight or require technical knowledge. In
any case, a recovery entails manual effort for the user.
For GE Link and Osram Lightify, the only way to
recover the attacked bulbs is a physical reset. The physical
reset is not specified in the ZLL standard, but can be
achieved by powering the bulbs on and off in a certain
manufacturer-specific pattern (e.g., 3s on, 5s off, repeat five
times). This is a challenging task and might not always work
the first time.
The Philips Hue system lacks a physical reset, to the
best of our knowledge. However, the Hue system supports an
additional commissioning mechanism manual search, which
is not specified in the ZLL standard. Manual search works
by entering a code that is printed on a Hue bulb into the Hue
app. The manual search fails if the channel of the attacked
device was altered.
Touchlink commissioning can be applied as an alterna-
tive recovery procedure for Hue bulbs. It can be performed
by using either the Hue API debug tool or a third-party app.
After the recommissioning with touchlink, an interesting
effect can be observed: Instead of reintegrating the attacked
bulb into the former network, the Hue bridge detects that the
network update identifier of the discovered device is higher
than its own. The Hue bridge adapts to the ‘latest’ network
settings and switches to the attacker-defined channel. Con-
sequently, the bridge loses the connection to all other bulbs,
which remain on the former channel. This behavior is spec-
ified in the ZLL specification. Afterwards, all other bulbs of
the former network have to be recommissioned to the new
network using touchlink. This is a quite cumbersome task,
because all devices have to be moved in close proximity (1-2
meters) to the Hue bridge in order to perform the touchlink
commissioning.
7.4. Exploitation of the Leaked ZLL Master Key
7.4.1. Hijack Attack. The hijack attack extends the denial-
of-service attack. Instead of sending arbitrary bytes as the
encrypted network key, the attacker forces the ZLL device
to update its current network key to an attacker-chosen key.
Procedure. Again, the attacker builds the network join end
device request inter-PAN command frame as described in
Section 7.3.4. The attacker-chosen network key is encrypted
using the leaked ZLL master key, the transaction identifier
from the scan request and the response identifier from the
scan response of the targeted ZLL device. This encrypted
network key is included into a network update request
and sent to the targeted ZLL device. On the reception of
a valid network join end device request, the ZLL device
updates its internal parameters according to the received
values and confirms the transaction by sending a network
join end device response. The targeted ZLL device is now
commissioned to the network of the attacker, which has full
control over this device. The legitimate network does not
recognize the shift. As a consequence, commands send by
the user will not be received anymore at the targeted ZLL
device.
Evaluation. In the evaluation, we were able to force ZLL
devices of all three connected lighting systems to accept
an attacker-chosen key. This attack paves the way to send
further application-specific commands to the ZLL devices.
7.4.2. Network Key Extraction Attack. An attacker is able
to extract the current network key by eavesdropping the scan
request, scan response, and the network join end device
request of an initial touchlink commissioning. Instead of
capturing the network join end device request, this attack can
also be performed by capturing a network start request. All
these command frames must belong to the same transaction,
i.e., contain the same transaction identifier.
Procedure. The user might be motivated to perform a
touchlink commissioning procedure by the run of a prior
reset or DoS attack (see Section 7.3.3). After extracting the
encrypted network key from the network join end device
request, the network key is decrypted as described in Sec-
tion 4.3.3. The response identifier is known from the scan
response, while the transaction identifier is included in all
packets belonging to the same transaction.
Evaluation. For this attack, the user of a connected lighting
system has to perform the touchlink commissioning proce-
dure. Our investigations concluded that only Hue lighting
systems can be targeted with this attack since only a few Hue
third-party apps as well as the Hue remote control triggers
this commissioning procedure. To the best of our knowledge,
there exist neither apps nor ZLL-certified devices for users
of Lightify or Link to perform the touchlink commissioning
procedure.
In our evaluation setup, we sent a Hue API command
to start a new touchlink commissioning procedure in an
infinite loop and by pushing the button with an automatic
construction, we were able to extract more than 13,000 valid
network keys. All extracted keys seem to be unique. With
the network key, an attacker can sniff and decrypt every
packet being send in the network. Furthermore, the injection
of commands is possible.
7.4.3. Inject Commands. To send commands to the tar-
geted device, we assume the knowledge of the current
network key (which should not be confused with the leaked
ZLL master key). The attacker knows the network key
through performing either a prior hijack attack (see Section
7.4.1) or a prior network key extraction attack (see Section
7.4.2).
Procedure. Assuming the attacker knows the current net-
work key, the attacker can send commands to the ZLL
devices. To control the bulbs, the attacker does not neces-
sarily need to know the so-called destination endpoint of the
lighting application of the bulb, since there is a broadcast
endpoint with which all applications in a device can be
addressed. The different commands and clusters to control
the color and brightness of the lights are described in the
ZigBee Cluster Library [12].
Evaluation. Our evaluation of the command injection
showed that all three lighting systems are vulnerable to this
attack. In our evaluation, we were able to send commands to
turn the bulbs on and off and to change the light color of the
Hue bulbs to any arbitrary color. If the command injection
follows a prior network key extraction attack, then the user
is usually able to send own commands to bulbs along with
the attacker. Otherwise, if the command injection follows a
prior hijack attack, then the user has no possibility to regain
control over the bulb except by performing the previously
presented measures.
7.5. Evaluation of Wireless Range
After we evaluated the feasibility of the attacks, we
analyzed their wireless range. The results are depicted in
Figure 7.
In the ZLL specification, the manufacturers are advised
to limit the wireless range of devices such that only ZLL
devices in close proximity are able to perform the ZLL
touchlink procedure. This limitation shall be implemented
in a way that the received signal strength of an initiator
device must be above a certain threshold. First of all, we
measured the maximum distance to successfully perform the
touchlink commissioning procedure with a Hue bridge since
0 10 20 30 40
Maximum distance [m]
Hue
Link
Lightify
Attacker: Ettus USRP
Attacker: Tmote Sky
Hue bridge
Figure 7: Maximum distances of successfully triggering the
touchlink procedure (Hue bridge) or the blink attack (Tmote
Sky, Ettus USRP) on the evaluated connected lighting sys-
tems.
the Lightify gateway and the Link hub provide no possibil-
ity to trigger the touchlink commissioning procedure. The
maximum distances to successfully perform the touchlink
commissioning procedure with the Hue bridge is 1.8 meters
for a Hue bulb as well as a Link bulb, and 1.6 meters for a
Lightify bulb.
Since the touchlink commissioning procedure is in-
tended to require close proximity, we investigated whether
the attacks work for longer distances. Therefore, we eval-
uated the two radio transceivers, presented in Section 7.1,
regarding the wireless attack range.
7.5.1. Moteiv Tmote Sky. The Tmote sky node from
Moteiv is suitable for short-distance scenarios. Our eval-
uations shows that we have a wireless range (line-of-sight)
of up to 3-4m to attack a Hue bulb, while we need to be
within the range of 1-2m (line-of-sight) to successful attack
the Lightify bulb. To attack the Link bulb, we must be in
the range of 2-3m (line-of-sight). These distances have been
measured indoor.
7.5.2. Ettus USRP B200. We measured the maximum
distance from which we are able to trigger a blink attack.
Therefore, we set up an outdoor testbed on a sports ground,
in which a line-of-sight between the USRP and the attacked
bulb was given. We also recorded the receiving signal
strength using the Ubertooth spectrum analyzer [33]. The
outdoor setup is shown in Figure 8.
At the USRP, we mounted antennas with 8dB gain
(according to the manufacturer). Our evaluation showed that
the three connected lighting systems have different ranges.
The maximum distance of the Osram Lightify system is 15
meters, the maximum distance of the GE Link system is
28 meters and the maximum distance of the Philips Hue
system is 37 meters. The distances depend on the noise
of the channel as well as the orientation of the bulbs and
the antennas of the USRP. We experimented with different
gain and antenna settings and also with different positions
and directions of the bulbs. From our measurement results,
(a) Evaluated light bulbs. (b) Attacker equipment.
Figure 8: Outdoor testbed to measure the maximum distance
and received signal strength of successfully attacking a ZLL-
certified light bulb.
we estimate that the received signal strength of inter-PAN
command frames has to be stronger than -40dBm.
The limitation of range is due to the fact that the USRP
did not receive the scan responses of the bulbs anymore due
to the low transmission power of the bulbs. However, with
a parabolic antenna, we assume that the receiving signal
strength of the scan responses could be amplified in order
to increase the maximum distance even further.
8. Discussion
In the first part, we discuss whether the security goals
in ZLL-based connected lighting systems are fulfilled. Then,
we outline which level of security meets the requirements of
connected lighting systems in the second part. In the third
part, we distill general security lessons learned for arbitrary
Internet-of-Things (IoT) systems.
8.1. Are Security Goals Satisfied?
Summarizing the related work as well as our novel at-
tacks, we realize that ZLL-based connected lighting systems
are insecure against local attackers. An attacker can take
complete control of any ZLL-certified lighting system since
the security weaknesses exist by design. Also, it is irrelevant
whether the targeted ZLL networks have been set up using
the classical or the touchlink commissioning procedure. The
attacks can be performed at any time, in any order and in
any number of repeats. Furthermore, we found out that close
proximity is not required. In our evaluation, we successfully
attacked the most popular connected lighting system, Philips
Hue, from a distance of 36 meters.
Besides insecurities in the ZLL standard, connected
lighting systems show a wide variety of other security
weaknesses: insufficient command authentication, unpro-
tected hardware debug interfaces, and stored key material in
plaintext in the manufacturer apps for mobile devices (cf.
Section 5).
To sum up, we state that the security goals for ZLL-
based connected lighting systems, presented in Section 4.1,
are not satisfied.
8.2. Should The Bulbs Be Protected?
Light bulbs neither gather sensitive information like
sensors (which could change in the future) nor put the
physical integrity of humans at immediate risk (as opposed,
e.g., to malfunctioning medical devices). As a consequence,
we need to answer the following questions: Which level
of security is needed for light bulbs? What are acceptable
risks?
The motivation for attacks on connected lighting sys-
tems might not be obvious at the first glance but becomes
apparent when considering different deployment areas of
these systems. Although the ZLL standard is originally
designed for residential lighting applications, it is currently
also deployed in the industrial settings [34]. Based on this
recent development, we assume that it will spread also in
further domains and therefore the motivation for attacks
will increase. We present three malicious motivations for
attackers: to annoy people, to cause financial damage, or to
impair health.
In residential lighting applications, an attacker might
only annoy or frighten residents by controlling the lights.
If an attacker can cause annoyance in businesses, however,
she can entail financial loss. In the hotel business, guests
might cancel their rooms resulting in a financial outage.
Considering companies, the productivity of employees can
be limited due to lighting blackouts. When lights constitute
a central part in work processes, e.g., through directing a
workflow, even a complete production standstill could be
triggered. In case the attackers’ motivations is to harm peo-
ple, she could attack connected lighting systems in medical
offices and hospitals. Misconducting lights could interrupt
surgeries, or when used for indication of vitals, cause faulty
treatments. Also causing epileptic seizures with flickering
lights is feasible.
A variety of radio transceivers exists that is capable to
perform the attacks presented in Section 7. Our equipment,
the Ettus USRP, is available for less than $700 on the US
market. The attacker must be capable of configuring the
radio transceiver and needs an implementation of the attack
procedures. Considering an increasing popularity of con-
nected lighting systems and the interest in attack equipment,
gray market vendors might develop ready-to-use attack hard-
ware.
In conclusion, assuming a high motivation of an capable
person to attack a connected lighting system, the risk that
the system can be controlled by the attacker is high.
8.3. Lessons Learned for IoT Security
Learning from the security analysis, we realize that
the design of a security architecture for connected lighting
systems (and also other IoT devices) is not trivial. At the first
sight, the security of the system seems solid as the specifica-
tion applies the well-known encryption and authentication
scheme AES-CCM*. Assuming a shared network key, an
attacker without knowledge of this key is not able to decrypt
or manipulate the AES-CCM*-encrypted messages. But the
results of our security analysis show that nevertheless an
attacker is able to gain full control of the devices by sending
valid messages to the bulbs. In the following, we summarize
the lessons learned from the weaknesses of the ZLL lighting
systems, which we can also apply to other IoT devices.
During our investigations, we extracted four critical points of
failures that weakens the security architecture of the system.
Use of Global Secret. The first critical point is the trust in
the safe-keeping of a pre-shared master key that is shared
among multiple manufacturers. IoT systems set high de-
mands regarding the key management because network keys
must be established in very heterogeneous systems, e.g.,
across different applications and across products of different
vendors. As we see in the case example of ZLL-based
connected lighting systems, both commissioning procedures
rely on an NDA-protected shared key (used to derive the
network key). The ZLL link key, used for the classical
commissioning, is not leaked yet, but of course, it can
happen anytime. That keys are prone to be leaked, even
if they are bound by an NDA, can be seen in the example
of the ZLL master key. More suitable solutions do not rely
on the secrecy of a master key. In the last decade, sev-
eral key bootstrapping techniques have been proposed and
evaluated, e.g., Resurrecting Duckling [35], which provide
the functionality to establish a network key between several
devices. Another wireless low-power standard, Bluetooth
Low Energy, introduced in version 4.2 a new pairing model
that uses elliptic curve cryptography to establish a network
key [36].
Fallback Mechanisms. The second critical point is the
implementation of fallback mechanisms in the key manage-
ment and the network protocol. To fulfill the demands of
functionality, the ZLL standard deploys fallback solutions in
case there exists no pre-shared key material. The motivation
might be to provide as high compatibility as possible. In the
case of ZLL, to allow the communication with other ZigBee
(but non-ZLL) devices. In general, a trade-off between
security and functionality is needed in IoT devices. User
might be rather willing to lower the security expectations
compared to having incompatible devices that cannot be
added to the home network due to missing key material. The
design of a security architecture must be simple and straight
forward such that there is no need for fallback mechanisms.
Furthermore, network protocols should be designed such
that only authorized commands overrule existing settings,
e.g., neither to join a bulb from one to another network
nor the reset-to-factory-state should be possible without
authorization.
Tamper-Resistent Hardware. The third critical point of
failure is the missing of tamper resistant hardware in IoT de-
vices. There are numerous examples of extracting firmware
and cryptographic material from IoT devices exploiting un-
protected debug interfaces [26], [37], [38]. In recent years,
a huge effort was put to protect other technologies like
smart cards, mobile phones and computers against tampering
attacks. Because the time-to-market and costs supposedly
constrain the security development of IoT devices, tamper-
resistance is not a priority. From our point of view, the
attacker model for IoT devices should consider hardware
tampering attacks as well as the extraction and reverse-
engineering of firmware images.
Reliance on Signal Strength. The fourth critical point
of failure is managing access to IoT networks based on
(simple) physical properties like signal strength. Using a
software-defined radio platform, an attacker can easily adjust
the transmit power to higher values as expected by certified
products. In this way, security measures can be circum-
vented. As shown in Section 7, in the case of the Philips
Hue lighting system, we are able to send valid messages
from a distance of over 30 meters, while the manufacturer
implemented a limitation aiming a wireless range of 2-3
meters.
9. Conclusion
Since the introduction to the market in 2012, connected
lighting systems showed a wide variety of insecurities, from
unprotected debug interfaces to fallback mechanisms in the
network protocol and unauthenticated command messages.
We presented a comprehensive overview of security research
regarding connected lighting systems, and performed a secu-
rity analysis of the most popular standard of these systems,
ZigBee Light Link. We disclosed further attacks in the
touchlink commissioning procedure and evaluated their im-
pact using our implemented penetration testing framework.
Learning from the security pitfalls of ZLL-based connected
lighting systems, we suggested improvements for securing
connected lighting systems and derived lessons for other IoT
systems.
Connected lighting systems based on the ZLL standard
need improvements of security measures. The coming Zig-
Bee 3.0 standard is announced to replace the ZLL profile.
Future investigations are required to determine whether the
security of connected lighting systems is improved with
ZigBee 3.0, or not. Also the ZigBee firmware update mech-
anisms provide an attractive target to evaluate if spreading
malware on IoT devices is feasible.
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